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Debt Capacity, Cost of Debt, and Corporate
Insurance
Hong Zou and Mike B. Adams∗
Abstract
Using a unique insurance dataset for a sample of Chinese publicly listed companies for
the period 1997 through 2003, this study tests the simultaneous linkages between debt
capacity, cost of debt, and corporate property insurance. Our results suggest that, on the
one hand, a higher cost of debt appears to motivate the use of more property insurance,
but high leverage alone does not lead to the purchase of more property insurance. The
latter finding might reflect the unique institutional setting of China, for example, where
there is a low chance of legally enforced company liquidation. Also, there is evidence
that leverage can interact with tangible assets intensity and exert a positive conjoint effect
on the corporate purchase of property insurance. On the other hand, we find evidence
that supports that property insurance helps expand insuring firms’ debt capacity and helps
lower their borrowing costs. However, the moderate evidence on the cost reduction effect
suggests that lowering the borrowing cost is likely to be a concern secondary to facilitating
corporate borrowing and thereby expanding debt capacity in corporate property insurance
decisions in China. Overall, we conclude that debt capacity, cost of debt, and corporate
insurance appear to be simultaneously related.
I. Introduction
Over the last two decades, researchers have made significant progress in un-
derstanding the conundrum of why large and widely held corporations engage in
costly risk management via the use of derivatives and/or insurance. While many
studies have empirically examined the determinants of corporate use of financial
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derivatives (e.g., see Mian (1996), Graham and Rogers (2002)), similar studies
of corporate purchases of insurance have been relatively sparse.1 This is largely
due to the fact that companies in developed markets such as the U.S. are required
to disclose their derivatives positions in annual reports, while there is no such re-
quirement concerning insurance purchases. On the other hand, Schmit and Roth
(1990) report that the corporate risk management literature has paid little atten-
tion to the effects of corporate risk management on other financial management
decisions, such as debt policy, despite their potential interrelation (e.g., see Smith
(1986)).2
This study contributes to our understanding of the managerial incentives for
corporate insurance by focusing on the simultaneous linkages between firms’ debt
capacity, cost of debt, and the voluntary use of property insurance in the People’s
Republic of China (PRC).3 Specifically, we seek to answer two interrelated ques-
tions. First, do firms’ indebtedness and cost of debt motivate the use of insurance?
Second, does insurance in turn affect firms’ debt capacity and cost of debt?
Insight into these questions is important for at least four reasons. First, Gra-
ham and Rogers (2002) report that debt motivates the corporate use of financial
derivatives and that using such instruments helps expand the debt capacity of
hedging firms. Given the contractual and other differences between insurance and
derivatives, it would be interesting to see whether this relation also holds in the
context of insurance. Unlike financial derivatives, insurance cannot be used for
speculation and therefore an insurance-based study like ours potentially provides
a cleaner test of the relation between debt and corporate risk management.
Second, prior insurance studies (e.g., Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori
(1999), Hoyt and Khang (2000), and Zou and Adams (2006)) have generally taken
corporate financial variables (e.g., leverage) as exogenous to risk management
decisions. As a result, these studies may potentially suffer from simultaneous
equation bias.
Third, the extant literature (e.g., Thakor (1982), Grace and Rebello (1993),
and Huberman (1997)) postulates that in states of information uncertainty about
future firm-specific risks, insurance could help company managers lower borrow-
ing costs and make positive net present value investments. Indeed, Cole and Of-
1The determinants of the corporate use of derivatives are not necessarily the same as those of using
insurance. For example, economies of scale are well pronounced in derivatives trading because of the
high set-up costs, but less important in insurance (Mayers and Smith (1990)). Five main prior studies
(Mayers and Smith (1990), Yamori (1999), Hoyt and Khang (2000), Zou, Adams, and Buckle (2003),
and Zou and Adams (2006)) have examined the determinants of corporate insurance in different ju-
risdictions. Their results suggest that ownership structure, leverage, firm size, growth opportunities,
managerial compensation, and regulatory status appear to be important factors affecting corporate
insurance.
2Guay (1999) examines the impact of derivatives’ use on firms’ business risks among new deriva-
tives users and documents a decline in firm-specific risks over time. Allayannis and Ofek (2001)
demonstrate that using derivatives helps reduce hedgers’ currency exposure. Graham and Rogers
(2002) test the tax incentives for derivatives hedging and show that the use of derivatives helps in-
crease hedging firms’ debt capacity and helps reduce expected tax liabilities.
3Our definition of property insurance covers indemnity for losses in physical assets (e.g. fixed
assets and inventory) due to fire, theft, and environmental perils (e.g., floods, storm damage, and
earthquakes). Undeveloped property (mainly the right to use land) is treated as an intangible asset
under Chinese accounting standards and so it is not insurable. Commercial property insurance in
China is voluntary.
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ficer (1981) and Kidwell, Sorensen, and Wachowicz (1987) cite evidence on the
interest benefits of financial guarantee insurance for issuers of U.S. municipal
bonds. However, these two studies only examine the relation between a narrowly
defined contractual form of insurance and a specific class of corporate borrow-
ing. This study, in contrast, focuses on the simultaneous linkage between the
cost of broadly defined debt (including bank loans and other types of corporate
borrowings) and property insurance—a commonly used risk management mech-
anism. Therefore, our study provides a more general context for investigating the
corporate debt-insurance relation.
Fourth, given the theoretical linkage between the cost of debt and property
insurance, it is surprising to note that none of the prior studies on the determi-
nants of corporate insurance considered the cost of debt as a potential covariate.
We contribute to the literature by showing that lowering the cost of debt is a mo-
tivating factor for corporate property insurance decisions in China.
In addition to data availability, we focus on China for three other reasons.
First, China provides an interesting setting for this study, since many Chinese
firms rely heavily on bank financing as equity and bond issues are tightly regulated
(see Section II). However, Chinese commercial lenders (particularly State-owned
banks) generally face higher credit risks than lenders in developed countries as
the prevalence of State ownership and the low likelihood of company liquidation
may induce borrowers’ moral hazard problems (Gul (1999), Tian (2001), and Wei,
Xie, and Zhang (2005)).
Second, we believe that understanding corporate financing and risk man-
agement decisions in China is important because it is a large and fast growing
economy and the largest recipient of foreign direct investment in the world (Sun
and Tong (2003)). China’s rapidly expanding capital markets and the increasing
number of Chinese firms seeking overseas listings have offered international in-
vestors increased prospects for risk diversification.4 However, Lee and Rui (2000)
observe that a key inhibitor to the efficient allocation of capital is the lack of
knowledge among investors of the operations of Chinese publicly listed compa-
nies (PLCs). Indeed, the recent improper trading of derivatives in the Singapore-
listed China Aviation Oil (CAO) Ltd. caused a loss of U.S.$550 million for inter-
national investors and creditors.5
Third, Chinese PLCs are also unique in terms of the presence of substantive
State share ownership—a feature rarely observed elsewhere (Gul (1999), Wei et
al. (2005)). For example, State ownership represents roughly one-third of total
shares outstanding and is present in about 90% of Chinese PLCs (China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) database (2000)). Accordingly, the role of State
ownership in affecting corporate insurance decisions in China is likely to be of
interest to policy makers, investors, and others with an economic interest in the
Chinese economy.
4Indeed, the Chinese stock market with about 1,100 quoted firms and a total market capitalization
of about U.S.$590 billion at the end of 2000 was ranked by Goldman Sachs (2001) as the most impor-
tant emerging stock market in the world and the second largest market in Asia after Japan. In order
to provide another channel for foreign investors to invest in the rapidly expanding Chinese capital
markets, China introduced the system of qualified foreign institutional investors (QFII) in 2002.
5See http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=10000080&sid=aqEPmLvSBrFc&refer=asia.
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Our results suggest that on the one hand, a high cost of debt appears to mo-
tivate the use of property insurance, but high leverage alone does not lead to the
purchase of more property insurance. The latter finding might reflect the unique
institutional setting of China, for example, the low probability of legally enforced
company liquidations. Also, there is evidence that leverage and tangible assets in-
tensity can interact and exert a positive conjoint effect on the corporate purchase
of property insurance. On the other hand, we find evidence supporting the hypoth-
esis that property insurance helps expand insuring firms’ debt capacity and lower
their borrowing costs. However, the limited evidence on the cost reduction effect
suggests that lowering the borrowing cost is likely to be a concern secondary to
facilitating corporate borrowings and thereby expanding debt capacity in making
corporate property insurance decisions in China. Indeed, buying insurance can
still be optimal even when the savings in lowering the cost of debt do not exceed
the insurance premium given other benefits of insurance (e.g., expanded debt ca-
pacity, reduced bankruptcy, and financial distress costs). Overall, we find that
debt capacity, cost of debt, and corporate insurance are simultaneously related.
Our findings are thus consistent with the view that insurance is an integral part of
corporate financial policies (e.g., see Smith (1986)).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
briefly the role of insurance and corporate financing in China, while Section III
formulates our main hypotheses. Section IV covers our research design, includ-
ing the regression procedures employed, control variables, and data description.
Section V discusses our main findings and the results of sensitivity tests, while
Section VI concludes the paper.
II. Corporate Financing and Insurance in China
The establishment of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) and the Shen-
zhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in the early 1990s marked the beginning of a hybrid
of debt and equity financing in the Chinese corporate sector (Ma (1998)). Since
then the sale of equity to the public has been tightly controlled (Chen and Yuan
(2004)). Until recently, China practiced a quota-based system for initial public of-
ferings (IPOs). Each year the State set a total national quota on new equity issues;
quotas were then allocated to various provinces and government ministries for
selecting firms to issue shares. As the quota is limited relative to demand, only a
small proportion of enterprises passed the screening process and undertook IPOs.
For seasoned equity issues, only rights offerings were allowed in China until the
regulatory reforms of 2000. Firms applying for equity issues had to go through
a lengthy screening process that included financial performance (e.g., return on
equity (ROE)6) and non-financial assessments (e.g., at least a one-year gap since
its last equity issue and no record of breaking the law) (Chen and Yuan (2004)).
Consequently, many Chinese firms had to rely on debt financing, particularly bank
loans, since bond issues were subject to tight controls (Sun and Tong (2003), Chen
(2004)). This situation means that debt capacity and the cost of debt are poten-
6For example, during 1997–1999, a Chinese firm eligible for a rights issue must report a ROE of
≥ 10% in each of the three years prior to the year of application.
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tially important factors in management decision making in the Chinese corporate
sector.
In China, non-performing loans currently account for about 25% of State-
owned banks’ total outstanding loans (Sun and Tong (2003)). Indeed, for social
and political reasons (e.g., with regard to maintaining employment and social sta-
bility), the Chinese government (national and local) has been reluctant to bankrupt
State-owned enterprises (SOEs). The CSRC only started to delist financially trou-
bled companies in 2001, but so far none of these companies have been formally
liquidated. Consequently, the presence of large blocks of State ownership may
induce moral hazard effects among borrowers (e.g., in terms of the reluctance
for managers to commit to loan repayment schedules given the low chance of
legally enforced liquidation), thereby increasing credit risks for lenders (Sun and
Tong (2003)). Additionally, China’s lack of comprehensive and reliable corporate
credit ratings data available to lenders in making loan decisions further increases
credit risks.
Given the higher credit risks in China, Chinese banks are expected to have
added incentives to request borrower risk reduction activities, including requiring
borrowers to provide adequate collateral and/or insurance coverage, in order to
lower credit risks. Indeed, a series of drastic market reforms in the banking sector
started in the early 1990s have stripped away the non-commercial responsibilities
of State-owned banks, strengthened bank risk management and financial controls,
and enhanced the accountability of loan decisions.7 China’s entry into the World
Trade Organization (WTO) has also introduced strong competition by large and
reputable foreign banks. As a result of these reforms, State-owned banks can be
viewed as market conscious commercial entities (Pei (1998), Li, Liu, Liu, and
Whitmore (2001)). Li et al. (2001) also note that private and joint stock banks in
China, which represent about 40% of banking businesses, are fully commercially
operated and, thus, they are ostensibly no different from their Western counter-
parts in their focus on profitability and risk management.
Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) report that insurance is an important
post-loss financing mechanism in companies; this is also the case in China (Zou
et al. (2003)). Ma, Lin, and Ma (1998) report that the corporate demand for in-
surance in the PRC is to a large extent driven by the ongoing corporate reforms
that began in 1978. Such market reforms have granted Chinese managers dis-
cretion over business decisions (including insurance decisions) and have signifi-
cantly weakened corporate affiliations (including financial links) with government
agencies (Ma (1998)). Furthermore, the public flotation of SOEs has introduced
multiple stakeholders (e.g., private individuals, foreign and institutional investors)
into Chinese PLCs. As a result, the accountability of Chinese managers has been
greatly enhanced so that they now have greater incentives to consider commercial
risk management options (e.g., insurance) than has hitherto been the case (Ma et
al. (1998)). The general lack of risk management expertise and limited risk man-
agement alternatives (e.g., financial derivatives) in China has further encouraged
managers to consider transferring some downside business risks (like unantici-
pated property losses) through the insurance market (Zou et al. (2003)).
7For details of the banking reform in China, please refer to Pei (1998) and Li et al. (2001).
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III. Hypotheses Development
A. Leverage and Property Insurance
Two types of debt-related costs—the expected costs of financial distress and
the agency costs arising from shareholder-debtholder conflicts—may induce firms
with high leverage to insure (Mayers and Smith (1982)).
First, firms with high leverage are likely to have higher expected costs of
financial distress (both direct and indirect) than firms with low leverage. As a
post-loss financing mechanism, insurance can mitigate the risk of severe cash
shortfalls following accidental loss events. Although Chinese PLCs are rarely
liquidated, this does not mean that they are free from the costs of financial distress.
Zou et al. (2003) argue that for Chinese PLCs such costs are mainly manifest in
the form of indirect costs associated with, for example, being disqualified from
raising equity capital, potential regulatory actions, the threat of takeover from the
corporate control market, and the loss of key customers and business suppliers.
For example, a major uninsured loss may result in a failure to meet the CSRC’s
profitability threshold for issuing public equity. The CSRC also requires that the
shares of firms reporting a loss for three consecutive years be subject to various
trading restrictions (e.g., one trading day per week and a narrow price band of
±5%). If the financial situation of such firms does not improve within one year,
they will be delisted. The managers of a loss making Chinese firm may also be
subject to the disciplining effects of the market for corporate control.
Different from the market for corporate control in the West, the main threat
to PLCs in China often comes from local government agencies that are controlling
shareholders in many companies (Zou et al. (2003)). Due to concerns about local
unemployment and the potential loss of tax revenues, local government officials
often have incentives to negotiate the transfer of (non-publicly tradable State-
held) shares in perennial loss making companies to other parties. As a result,
incumbent management is often replaced following a change in the controlling
shareholder. Indeed, Firth, Fung, and Rui (2002) report that management turnover
in Chinese PLCs was negatively related to firms’ financial performance during the
period 1998 through 2000. Therefore, we argue that the indirect costs of financial
distress may motivate managers in firms with high leverage to insure their assets.
In fact, Warner (1977) argues that the indirect costs of financial distress are often
greater than the direct costs such as liquidation and legal fees.
Second, the underinvestment problem may occur in firms with high leverage
after an accidental loss because shareholders and managers fear that the bene-
fits of reinvestment in damaged or lost assets accrue mainly to debtholders with
fixed claims (Mayers and Smith (1982)). In China, government agencies as large
shareholders are unlikely to exercise their “default put option” and liquidate a firm
suffering from a major uninsured loss. However, company managers may choose
to underinvest in potentially positive net present value reinvestment projects. This
is because such underinvestment may prevent the majority of potential gains from
being captured by debtholders, thereby leaving more funds available for manage-
rial perquisite consumption and “empire building.” This is possible in China as
insiders’ control is often strong in State-controlled PLCs, given that government
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bureaucrats have few financial incentives to closely oversee management (Xu and
Wang (1999)). Mayers and Smith (1982) note that insurance can help alleviate
the underinvestment incentives of shareholders in firms with high leverage. For
example, insurance can help secure funding for the replacement of key manufac-
turing and/or office facilities damaged in insured events such as fires, storms, and
floods. Therefore, our first hypothesis is:
H1a. Ceteris paribus, companies with higher leverage are likely to purchase more
property insurance than companies with lower leverage.
As the purchase of property insurance in firms with high leverage may be
conditioned on their insurable physical assets, we also include an interaction term
between leverage and the tangible assets ratio and expect the interaction term to be
positively correlated with the purchase of insurance. Consequently, a subsidiary
hypothesis is:
H1b. Ceteris paribus, the insurance-debt relation is likely to increase with the
amount of tangible assets.
Leland (1998) argues that risk management can help reduce the financial
risk of a firm and thereby expand its debt-bearing capacity. Indeed, Graham and
Rogers (2002) find supporting evidence for this contention using financial deriva-
tives data from the U.S. corporate sector. The insurance of collaterized assets at
the time when debt is issued means that the likelihood of future loan losses can be
reduced and that as a consequence of the lower default risk, the borrower can in-
crease its debt capacity given the larger expected collateral value, net of expected
bankruptcy costs. The lender is also likely to charge the borrower a lower interest
rate in a competitive market in light of the existence of insurance coverage. If the
borrower takes out property insurance after the loan is granted, the lender gains
by facing lower expected losses for the same interest risk premium. With lowered
expected bankruptcy costs, the borrower may be able to renegotiate with the cur-
rent lender and/or approach other new lenders on more favorable loan terms (e.g.,
a lower interest rate and/or larger loan size). Therefore, our second hypothesis is:
H2. Ceteris paribus, companies carrying more property insurance are likely to
have a higher debt capacity than companies carrying less property insurance.
B. Cost of Debt and Property Insurance
Thakor (1982) develops adverse selection-based models that seek to explain
the (potentially costly) use of insurance in light of managerial trade-offs with
other decisions such as financing and investment choices. In his model, Thakor
(1982) contends that information production by insurers acting as intermediaries
between borrowers and lenders helps facilitate debt transactions by providing
lenders with assurance as to the future security of their loan. As a result, the pur-
chase of property insurance can help reduce the costs that lenders face in screening
borrowers’ creditworthiness before the debt is issued and in monitoring their com-
pliance with debt covenants after the debt is issued (Grace and Rebello (1993)).
Therefore, if there is an appropriate insurance program in the borrowing firm,
the credit risks facing corporate lenders can be significantly reduced. Corporate
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lenders, in turn, might agree to grant loans at terms and conditions that reduce
borrowers’ cost of debt. This possibility may be reinforced by market compe-
tition for creditworthy clients among banks in China. As a result, a borrower
could purchase property insurance as a bonding mechanism to mitigate lenders’
concerns about the probability of bankruptcy following unanticipated losses; by
shifting hazard risks from debtholders to insurance companies, property insurance
may help reduce the market cost of debt (Thakor (1982), Grillet (1992), Grace and
Rebello (1993), and Huberman (1997)). Property insurance purchases can be ben-
eficial when the savings in interest payments exceed the premium paid. However,
it is important to note that insurance may still be optimal for borrowers even if
the savings in interest payments are less than the premiums. This is because in
addition to a possible reduction in the interest rate, insurance protection can have
other benefits (e.g., reduced costs of financial distress and lowered agency costs
of the underinvestment problem).8 Our third and fourth hypotheses are:
H3. Ceteris paribus, firms facing a higher cost of borrowing are likely to insure
their assets to a greater extent than firms with a lower cost of borrowing.
H4. Ceteris paribus, firms carrying more property insurance are likely to have a
lower cost of borrowing than firms carrying less property insurance.
IV. Research Design
A. Models
To test our hypotheses, we adopt the following system of simultaneous equa-
tion models:
INS = f{DEBT, COD, Control Variables} + ϕ,(1)
DEBT = f{INS, COD, Control Variables} + v,(2)
COD = f{INS, DEBT, Control Variables} + γ.(3)
INS is the amount of property insurance purchased. Following Zou et al.
(2003) and Zou and Adams (2006), INS is defined as the total annual corporate
spending on property insurance scaled by the prior year-end book value of tangi-
ble assets (e.g., fixed assets and inventory).9 As in Graham and Rogers (2002),
debt capacity (DEBT) is measured by the book value of total (long- and short-
term) debt ÷ total assets. COD is a firm’s interest cost per Renminbi (RMB) of
debt used.10 As in Jun and Jen (2003) and Pittman and Fortin (2004), we measure
COD as (interest expense charged to the P&L account + capitalized interests) ÷
the book value of total debt.11
8We thank the referee for suggesting this point.
9We assume that property insurance decisions are made at the beginning of the accounting year.
Property insurance contracts are normally valid for one year and renewable annually thereafter.
10Renminbi (RMB) is the Chinese currency.
11As Chinese company accounting disclosures do not give a breakdown of interest charges relating
to each class of debt contract (e.g., bank loans, bonds, notes payable, and borrowing from non-bank
institutions), we use the ratio of interest to total debt as our preferred measure of the cost of debt.
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We control for industry effects in two ways. First, we adjust DEBT and COD
by subtracting their respective industry median from a firm/year’s debt and cost of
debt ratio. Industry medians are calculated on the basis of the primary three-digit
industry code as prescribed by the 2001 CSRC industry classification-B. Second,
we also include 20 industry dummies determined by the two-digit industry code
in equations (1)–(3).12
We expect that in equation (2), firms with a higher cost of borrowing are
likely to have lower leverage than firms with a lower borrowing cost. We also
predict that in equation (3), leverage has a positive impact on the cost of borrowing
for two reasons. First, firms with higher leverage are more susceptible to financial
distress and so have a greater risk of debt default (Petersen and Rajan (1994),
Johnson (1997)). Second, shareholders in firms with high leverage are expected
to have greater incentives to engage in asset substitution and underinvestment that
is potentially harmful to debtholders’ economic interests (Jensen and Meckling
(1976)).
B. Control Variables and Measurement
We follow the extant literature and control for other major determinants of
corporate insurance, capital structure, and the cost of debt. The motivation and
measurement of these variables are briefly discussed below.13
1. Other Determinants of Property Insurance
Tangible Assets Intensity. Tangible assets intensity is included to control
for the impact of differences in asset structure on property insurance purchases.
Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggest that firms with more tangible assets are able
to provide more collateral for borrowing and so they are likely to purchase more
property insurance than others. Tangible assets intensity is defined as the ratio
of the book value of tangible assets (i.e., fixed assets and inventory) to the book
value of total assets.14
Growth Opportunities. Firms with more growth opportunities tend to be
riskier than firms with fewer growth opportunities and so they may have rela-
tively higher costs of financial distress (Myers (1984)). Such firms are also ex-
pected to face a higher cost of external financing due to a more severe information
asymmetry problem about the future quality of new projects (Myers and Majluf
(1984)). Insurance not only reduces the risk of bankruptcy and thereby financial
distress costs, but also lowers the incidence of cash flow shortfalls (following a
major accidental loss) that could trigger a reduction in value-enhancing invest-
ments (Froot et al. (1993)). The presence of insurance may also help reduce the
cost arising from a fire sale of assets when a firm has a cash flow shortfall. We
follow Graham and Rogers (2002) and use the ratio of capital expenditures (in
12We include in the regression models industry dummies determined by the two-digit rather than the
three-digit industry code to keep the number of industry dummies manageable and conserve degrees
of freedom. Refer to the Appendix for further details.
13In an early version of the paper, we also include a tax convexity measure prescribed by Graham
(1996) and Barton (2001) in equation (1), but as in Graham and Rogers (2002) we find it insignificant.
14As noted earlier, undeveloped properties (mainly the right to use land) in China are treated as
intangible assets and so are not included in the tangible assets ratio.
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acquiring fixed assets and long-term intangible assets) to total assets as a proxy.
A high ratio of capital expenditure to total assets is likely to indicate greater fu-
ture growth opportunities than otherwise. We expect a positive relation between
growth opportunities and property insurance coverage.15
Firm Size. Small companies tend to buy relatively more insurance than large
companies because the expected direct costs of financial distress are not propor-
tional to size (Warner (1977)) and small companies can gain more from insur-
ers’ real services, e.g., advice on loss prevention and control (Hoyt and Khang
(2000)). We measure firm size as the natural logarithm of total assets at 1997
constant prices.
Managerial Ownership. Two arguments explain the effects of managerial
share ownership on corporate insurance decisions. The managerial risk aversion
hypothesis argues that managers with a high level of stock ownership are likely
to insure more in order to reduce their (underdiversified) wealth risk (e.g., see
Smith and Stulz (1985)).16 In contrast, the incentive-alignment hypothesis posits
that as managers’ stock ownership increases, their economic interest is likely to
become more closely aligned with that of shareholders, thereby motivating them
to maximize the value of their shares (viewed as a call option on the firm’s assets)
by increasing the level of firm risk (Saunders, Strock, and Travlos (1990)). This
implies a negative relation between the amount of insurance held by firms and
the level of managerial ownership. Additionally, insurance can help managers
maximize firm value by lowering potential financial distress costs and mitigating
the underinvestment problem (Mayers and Smith (1982)). Overall, the effect of
managerial ownership on property insurance is an empirical issue. In the spirit
of Hall and Murphy (2002), we measure managerial ownership as the natural
logarithm of the market value of managerial shareholdings. One RMB is added
in order to facilitate the log transformation of zero values. The market value is
computed using a monthly average share price in the year concerned.
State Ownership. Zou et al. (2003) predict that State shareholdings should
discourage managers from taking out insurance, as government shareholders may
provide financial assistance (e.g., subsidies and/or loan support) and other help
(e.g., business contacts) to the firms in which they retain a large stake (Gul (1999),
Tian (2001), and Wei et al. (2005)). On the other hand, State-owned PLCs are
rarely liquidated, so managerial incentives to insure asset-loss risks can be re-
duced because of the possible bailout by the State in the event of severe property
losses. However, Zou et al. (2003) find no empirical support for this view.
We advance an alternative argument—the political incentive hypothesis—
that predicts State ownership may have a positive effect on corporate insurance.
Xu and Wang (1999) argue that managers of SOEs are essentially no different
from government officials who pursue self-interested political careers. Therefore,
SOE managers could be motivated to insure company assets because an uninsured
15Using the market-to-book value ratio as a growth proxy can be problematical in China given that
about two-thirds of shares held by the State and some institutional investors are not publicly tradable
and the nascent Chinese stock markets tend to be very volatile. The use of other growth measures like
research and development (R&D) expenditures is also precluded by the lack of data.
16We focus on managerial ordinary (common) stock ownership because equity-option plans are
currently undeveloped in China (e.g., see Firth et al. (2002)).
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major loss may be counted as functional incompetence and/or a neglect of duty,
which would have an adverse effect on their future career prospects. Additionally,
a lack of corporate liquidation in China does not protect creditors from future
losses due to loan default, and as such, debtholders might still demand property
insurance even in the presence of substantial government shareholdings. The risk
of loan default and reliance on uninsured collateralized assets also reduces the
ability of managers in State-controlled companies to access debt financing from
sources other than State-run banks (which may charge higher rates of interest,
impose restrictive lending conditions, and/or offer loans of smaller size). As a
result, firms with substantial State ownership may still need to insure their assets.
We measure State shareholdings as the ratio of the number of shares held by the
State to the total number of shares outstanding.
Fiscal Subsidies. While market reforms have significantly weakened Chi-
nese companies’ affiliations with government agencies, some companies still re-
ceive fiscal subsidies from the local or national government (often in the form of
tax rebates and occasionally in the form of direct subsidies from a local finance
bureau when the firm is on the verge of being disqualified for future equity is-
sues or delisted). These fiscal benefits may discourage managers from insuring
potential asset-loss risks. Fiscal subsidies are measured by total annual subsidies
received from government agencies scaled by annual sales income.17
Financial Constraints. Several studies (e.g., Haushalter (2000), Graham and
Rogers (2002), and Zou and Adams (2006)) report that financial constraints may
limit corporate risk management activities. We control for this possibility by in-
cluding the quick ratio, defined as (current assets−inventory)÷current liabilities,
in our analysis. A positive and significant coefficient on the quick ratio is consis-
tent with the financial constraint argument. However, it is also possible that firms
with a low quick ratio may face a high cost of debt and need to provide insured col-
lateral. Additionally, the post-loss financing function of insurance may be more
valuable for firms with financial constraints than firms with a high liquidity. This
line of reasoning suggests a negative effect of the quick ratio on the purchase of
property insurance.
Secured Debt. When a firm has secured debt, it is common to carry property
insurance on the tangible assets serving as collaterals. We therefore explicitly
control for this possibility by including the proportion of secured debt (i.e., the
year-end amount of secured debt ÷ total liabilities) in our analysis.18
Firms Located in the Eastern Coast. To meet the exclusion restrictions that
are necessary for identification in the Heckman model (e.g., see Villalonga and
Amit (2006)), we follow Zou and Adams (2006) and include a geographical lo-
cation variable (with 1 denoting firms from China’s Eastern coast and 0 for firms
from inland areas) in the insurance probit model, but exclude it from the insurance
volume model. The rationale is that managers of companies located in the more
17We scale subsidies by annual sales rather than by taxable income because some firms in our
sample reported negative taxable income and Chinese firms are reported to manage reported earnings
through the use of one-time extraordinary items (Chen and Yuan (2004)).
18Corporate debt is sometimes secured on the right to use land that is not insurable in China.
Furthermore, a breakdown of secured debt by types of collaterized assets is not available from public
sources in China. Accordingly, our proxy for secured debt may be a noisy measure.
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economically developed Eastern coast of China (e.g., Beijing, Shanghai, Guang-
dong) tend to have a higher level of risk management awareness and so are more
likely to use property insurance than their counterparts in companies located in
inland areas. However, the literature is not clear as to whether geographical loca-
tion influences the amount of property insurance. As such, geographical location
is used as a selectivity bias identifier in our insurance probit model (see Section
IV.C.2).
Industry Membership. We control for two types of firms that may have an
intrinsically high demand for property insurance.19 First, businesses including the
manufacturing of chemicals, plastics and rubber, oil and gas extraction/refining,
coal mining, and metallurgical engineering are prone to accidental losses (here-
after termed as “high property risk firms”). The second type includes firms that
are likely to have relatively high financial distress costs compared to other firms.
For example, high growth firms whose firm value comprises mainly intangible
growth opportunities are likely to have high financial distress costs relative to
firms that proportionately have more assets-in-place. This is because intangible
growth opportunities are only valuable when a firm remains a going concern (My-
ers (1984)). We follow Ritter and Welch ((2002), p. 1801) and define such firms
as hi-tech stock firms, which include Internet companies, firms engaging in the
manufacturing of computer software and hardware, communication equipment,
pharmaceuticals, and bio-tech firms. We predict that if property insurance helps
mitigate the underinvestment problem of high growth firms, such firms are ex-
pected to purchase more property insurance than other firms, other things being
equal. In recognizing the possibility that the purchase of property insurance by
hi-tech stock firms may be conditioned on the amount of tangible assets, we also
include an interaction term between the hi-tech stock dummy and tangible asset
intensity. All else equal, the interaction term is expected to have a positive effect
on the purchase of property insurance.
Mayers and Smith (1982) argue that firms in highly regulated industries (e.g.,
utilities) may purchase more property insurance than less regulated firms because
of pressure from industry regulators and/or their ability to pass insurance costs
onto customers. We therefore include a dummy for regulated utilities and expect
it to be positively correlated with the use of property insurance.
Moreover, 20 industry dummies, categorized by the two-digit industry code
of the 2001 CSRC industry classification-B, are also included in the insurance,
debt ratio, and cost of debt equations as further controls for industry effects.
2. Other Determinants of Debt Capacity
We include five commonly recognized determinants of corporate financial
leverage (i.e., firm size, tangible assets intensity, growth opportunities, profitabil-
ity, and non-debt tax shields) and one institutional factor (i.e., State ownership) in
our analysis. Two different capital structure theories—the static trade-off model
and the pecking order hypothesis (POH)—generally have different predictions
on the effect of these factors on leverage (Rajan and Zingales (1995), Fama and
French (2002), and Frank and Goyal (2003)). For example, the static trade-off
19We thank the referee for this suggestion.
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model predicts that large and profitable companies and firms with high tangible
assets intensity and/or less growth opportunities are likely to have higher leverage
than other firms because of their better access to debt markets, greater exposure to
taxes, and likely lower agency costs associated with the debt overhang problem.
In contrast, the POH posits that large firms, firms with high tangible assets in-
tensity and/or less growth opportunities tend to face less information asymmetry,
and so they are likely to use more equity instead of debt than other firms. The
POH also predicts that because profitable firms are more capable of securing in-
ternal financing via retained profits, they are less likely to use external debt than
other firms (Fama and French (2002)). To be cautious about the confounding ef-
fects of earnings management in China, we use annual operating profit, instead of
net profit, which we divide by the prior year-end book value of total assets as a
measure of profitability.
Non-debt tax shields (e.g., depreciation) may offset the tax advantages af-
forded by paying interest (Bradley, Jarrell, and Kim (1984)). As in Graham and
Rogers (2002), we measure non-debt tax shields as annual sales and general and
administrative (SG&A) expenses (including depreciation but excluding interest)
divided by sales income.
State Ownership. Gul (1999), Tian (2001), and Wei et al. (2005) note that in
China, the State may provide assistance in helping firms in which it has a large
block of shareholdings secure bank loans. Therefore, firms with more State own-
ership may have higher leverage than firms with less State ownership. However,
firms with more State ownership may gain better access to the domestic stock
markets given that in China the government’s equity quota allocation is geared to
SOEs. Therefore, we do not have an a priori expectation on the relation between
State ownership and leverage.
Interest Coverage. We also control for the effect of the interest coverage ratio
(a proxy for a borrower’s ability to pay interest) on leverage. Firms with adequate
interest coverage may be more likely to secure bank loans than firms with low
interest coverage. However, such firms could be profitable and more likely to
secure financing via retained profits rather than by borrowing. Therefore, the
effect of interest coverage on leverage is ambiguous. The interest coverage ratio
is defined as the ratio of earnings before interest, tax, and extraordinary items to
annual total interest incurred.20
3. Other Determinants of the Cost of Debt
The following firm-specific characteristics and economy-wide factors that
may affect the cost of debt are controlled for.
Firm Size, Age, and Tangible Assets Intensity. Large firms generally have
greater financial strength and a lower default risk and therefore may pay a lower
interest rate than small firms (Diamond (1984), Petersen and Rajan (1994)). Like-
wise, newly launched firms tend to be riskier and have a higher rate of failure than
long-established firms (Leeth and Scott (1989)). Younger firms also have little
reputational capital value to lose if their managers engage in behavior that is con-
20In China, banks are likely to pay more attention to a borrower’s recurring income when eval-
uating credit risks than the bottom-line earnings figure due to concerns about managerial earnings
manipulation.
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trary to lenders’ interests (Johnson (1997)). Therefore, we expect that both firm
size and age are inversely related to the cost of debt. Firm age is measured as the
number of years since incorporation. Since firms with more tangibles assets may
be able to provide more collateral and/or more property insurance, we therefore
expect the tangible assets to total assets ratio is negatively related to the cost of
debt.
Interest Coverage and Sales Growth. As in Petersen and Rajan (1994), the
interest coverage ratio and sales growth rate are both expected to be negatively
related to the cost of debt. The interest coverage ratio is defined previously and
the sales growth ratio is calculated as year-on-year growth in sales income.
Prime Lending Rate. As in Petersen and Rajan (1994), we control for the
influence of prime lending rates that are set by the Central Bank (the People’s
Bank of China (PBOC)) on firms’ borrowing costs. We use the one- to three-year
rate of bank loans issued by the PBOC in corresponding years as a proxy for the
prime rate and expect it to have a positive effect on firms’ borrowing costs.
State Ownership. As discussed in Section II, a high level of State ownership
may expose lenders to a higher credit risk. Therefore, lenders may charge such
firms a higher interest rate than normal. On the other hand, the government may
exert its influence by assisting firms in which it retains a large stake to secure
bank loans at favorable terms. Therefore, the effect of State ownership on firms’
average borrowing costs is not clear.
Board Characteristics. Anderson, Mansi, and Reeb (2004) find that the cost
of debt is inversely related to board independence, board size, and the indepen-
dence of audit committees. They attribute these findings to the role of these cor-
porate governance mechanisms in enhancing the reliability of financial reports.
On the other hand, Yermack (1996) reports that large boards tend to reduce firm
performance, which implies that firms with large boards may be associated with a
higher cost of debt than those firms with smaller boards.21 As a result, we control
for the effect of the proportion of independent directors on the board and board
size (measured as the natural logarithm of the number of directors). Other things
being equal, we expect the proportion of independent directors to be negatively
related to the cost of debt, but the influence of board size on debt costs is not clear
from the literature.22
Debt Structure. Different types of debt are likely to have different costs
and so debt structure may affect the total interest cost of debt. For example, bank
loans may be more expensive to use than notes payable and trade credits. As bank
loans are a major source of corporate borrowing in China, we include the ratio of
(long- and short-term) bank loans to total debt as an additional control variable
and predict that it will have a positive impact on the overall cost of debt.23
21We thank the referee for suggesting this point.
22Few Chinese PLCs have established audit committees so far (e.g., see Wei et al. (2005)).
23Under Chinese accounting standards, liabilities arising from leasing are treated as “other (long-
term) payables” and thus an integral part of total debt. In previous tests, we controlled for the propor-
tion of bond, notes payable, accounts payable, and “other payables,” but obtained similar results.
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C. Sample
1. Construction of the Main Sample
In selecting our main sample, we first impose the following restrictions.
i) A firm should not be in the financial services sector (i.e., banks, insurance,
and securities companies) because they account and report under different rules
and are generally active in the trading of risk management products/services.
ii) A firm should not have experienced any material company reorganizations
in the sample period. Company reorganizations in China typically include asset
swaps, debt transfer, and divestitures among associated companies. Such com-
pany reorganizations can dramatically change a firm’s asset and debt structure
and so could distort the interpretation of our results.24
iii) A firm/year should have all the accounting and share price information
needed for the variables specified in equations (1)–(3).
We manually checked the annual reports of qualifying firms from 1997
through 2003, which represents the longest period for which full-text annual re-
ports of Chinese PLCs were available at the time our study was carried out. We
identified 2,016 firm/year observations reporting annual spending on commercial
property insurance, which covers 707 firms.25
Company-specific share price data were extracted from DataStream and ac-
counting information other than insurance spending and capitalized interest ex-
penses was obtained from CSMAR Securities Research Database (developed by
Shenzhen GTA Ltd. and Hong Kong Polytechnic University) and WIND Finan-
cial Information System (developed by Shanghai Wind Ltd.). The former is often
used by academics and the latter is a leading data provider to institutional in-
vestors. The two data sources were cross-checked to ensure data consistency.
2. Sample Selectivity Bias
By focusing on Chinese PLCs (voluntarily) disclosing property insurance
spending, our study potentially suffers from sample selectivity bias. Address-
ing this problem involves the identification of firms carrying no insurance. We
obtained the non-insurance sample (i.e., 75 observations) for the period 1997
through 1999 from Zou and Adams (2006) who conducted a telephone-based sur-
vey of all Chinese PLCs. We also sent a simple email instrument to the designated
representative responsible for information disclosures in all qualifying firms for
the period 2000 through 2003 by asking whether these firms carried commercial
property insurance. The name and email address of the designated representative
of each firm are identified from the CSRC’s official website. After three rounds
of contacts (one initial contact and two follow-ups), we received replies from 122
firms (488 observations); this represents a response rate of approximately 9%.
Such a low response rate supports the view expressed by Roy, Walters, and Luk
24The materiality of asset reorganization is determined in this study by applying the official criteria
laid down by the CSRC—i.e., more than a 30% change in the value of tangible assets.
25Several large Chinese PLCs, notably those from the oil and chemical industries, buy insurance
from parent-run group insurance pools or captive insurance subsidiaries. Such internal insurance is
different from external commercial insurance (e.g., insurance captives write very little, if any, third
party risks business) and so such firms are excluded from our data set.
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(2001) that various political, social and cultural constraints in China make it dif-
ficult to conduct field-based data collection. After excluding firms/years “unclear
about carrying insurance” and observations previously included in the insurance
firms’ sample identified from the annual reports, we were left with a usable dataset
of 379 additional observations (of which 239 observations insured their assets and
140 observations did not). Combining this dataset with the 75 firms/years carry-
ing no property insurance for the period 1997 through 1999, we end up with the
sample detailed in Table 1.
TABLE 1
Sample Information
Table 1 presents sample information.
No. of Obs.
Firms carrying and disclosing insurance spending in annual reports 2,016
Firms carrying but not disclosing insurance spending in annual reports 239
Subtotal 2,255
Firms carrying no property insurance 215
Total 2,470
Our study may face two types of sample selectivity. The first is whether a
firm insures its assets or not and the second is whether a firm carrying property
insurance chooses to disclose it in its annual report or not. Because a firm’s deci-
sion on whether to purchase insurance and/or to disclose such purchase may not
be random, selectivity bias can cause the error terms in our models to be corre-
lated, thereby biasing the estimated regression parameters. Following Guedes and
Opler (1996) and Pincus and Rajgopal (2002), we adopt a variant of the Heckman
sample selection model. Specifically, we estimate two probit selection models
(hereafter referred to as the “insurance probit” and the “disclosure probit” mod-
els, respectively) and generate the inverse Mills ratio from each probit. We then
include the two inverse Mills ratios into our system of simultaneous equations as
corrections for the potential sample selection bias. In the insurance probit model,
the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable that takes the value of 1 for firms
carrying insurance and 0 otherwise. Explanatory variables entering the insurance
probit model are described in Section IV.B.1, with the Eastern coast dummy as the
selection identifier. In the disclosure probit model, the dependent variable is a di-
chotomous variable that takes 1 if a firm carries property insurance and discloses
it in the annual reports and 0 for otherwise.
While no prior study has examined the factors affecting the disclosure of
insurance purchases, we include as explanatory variables those firm characteris-
tics that are commonly cited as determinants of corporate voluntary disclosures
(e.g., Chen and Jaggi (2000), Healy and Palepu (2001), and Xiao, Yang, and
Chow (2004)), which includes firm size, profitability, risk factors (leverage and
the quick ratio), (domestic) public share ownership, foreign ownership, the pro-
portion of independent directors, and whether a firm is a conglomerate (denoted
by 1). Domestic public share ownership is defined as the proportion of tradable A-
shares. Foreign ownership is the sum of the proportion of foreign founder share
ownership, (domestically traded) B-shares and (overseas traded) H-shares. The
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other variables are defined in Section IV.B. Given that in China corporate insur-
ance spending is normally disclosed as a sub-item in the notes to unamortized
expenses, a firm with high levels of amortized expenses is more likely to item-
ize its insurance spending (if any). We therefore include unamortized expenses
(scaled by total assets) as a further explanatory variable for property insurance
disclosure.
V. Results
A. Sample Characteristics and Correlation Analysis
Table 2 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables used. Consistent with
Zou et al. (2003), the median of the property insurance to tangible assets ratio
is about 0.1%. In our sample, the proportion of firms/years carrying no property
insurance is about 8.7% of the total number of observations and this is comparable
to the figure of 11.2% reported in Zou and Adams (2006).
TABLE 2
Summary of Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in the analysis. The meaning of each variable is self-
explanatory and calculation details are given in the Appendix. Presented statistics on DEBT and COD are based on
raw data. The number of observations entering the insurance probit model, the disclosure probit model, and the second-
stage system of simultaneous equations is 2,470, 2,250, and 2,016 observations, respectively. Five observations are lost
due to missing values in ownership variables in the disclosure probit model. The book value of total assets is expressed
in 10,000 RMB and the market value of managerial shares is in RMB.
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Insurance choice dummy 0.910 1.000 0.282 0 1 2,470
Log(book value of assets) 13.343 11.881 3.643 9.382 24.842 2,470
Debt to assets ratio (DEBT ) 0.458 0.456 0.173 0.018 0.999 2,470
Interest to debt ratio (COD) 0.034 0.033 0.021 0.001 0.455 2,470
Tangible assets to assets ratio 0.502 0.497 0.164 0.016 0.999 2,470
Capital expenditure to total assets ratio 0.064 0.041 0.071 0.000 0.749 2,470
Log(1 + market value of managerial shares) 10.663 12.967 5.497 0.000 20.016 2,470
Fiscal subsidy to sales ratio 0.012 0.000 0.098 0.000 2.532 2,470
Proportion of State shareholdings 0.308 0.311 0.260 0.000 0.886 2,470
Quick ratio 1.293 0.989 1.178 0.010 14.504 2,470
Secured debt to total debt ratio 0.082 0.010 0.138 0.000 0.720 2,470
Eastern coast dummy 0.529 1.000 0.499 0 1 2,470
Regulated utilities dummy 0.080 0.000 0.266 0 1 2,470
Conglomerates dummy 0.160 0.000 0.368 0 1 2,470
High property risk firms dummy 0.230 0.000 0.424 0 1 2,470
Hi-tech stock dummy 0.040 0.000 0.194 0 1 2,470
Insurance disclosure dummy 0.896 1.000 0.302 0 1 2,250
Operating profit to assets 0.031 0.035 0.064 −0.642 0.311 2,250
Domestic public ownership 0.348 0.342 0.136 0.000 1.000 2,250
Foreign ownership 0.050 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.660 2,250
Proportion of independent directors 0.102 0.000 0.141 0.000 0.556 2,250
Unamortized expenses to total assets ratio 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.043 2,250
Insurance to tangible assets ratio (INS) 0.002 0.001 0.003 0.0002 0.045 2,016
SG&A expense 0.192 0.129 0.446 0.008 14.198 2,016
Firm age (years) 7.520 7.000 4.249 1.000 46.000 2,016
Sales growth ratio 1.253 1.112 1.340 0.023 34.110 2,016
Prime lending rate 0.065 0.059 0.015 0.055 0.107 2,016
Log of board size 2.227 2.197 0.252 1.100 2.944 2,016
Bank loans to total debt ratio 0.534 0.561 0.199 0.000 0.944 2,016
Interest coverage ratio 36.189 2.262 653.5 −47.5 24,244.2 2,016
On average, the total interest to debt ratio is roughly 3.3%, which is less than
the 5.9% median prime lending rate for bank loans over the sample period. This
suggests that in China some non-bank debt (e.g., notes payable, trade credit) may
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bear a lower cost than bank loans. Indeed, bank loans on average represent about
53% of total debt, with the remainder of debt coming from other sources. Sample
firms on average have a debt ratio of 46% and this figure is comparable to the
47% average for all Chinese PLCs in 1998 (Li et al. (2001)). Consistent with
Chen (2004) and Zou and Xiao (2006), a further examination reveals that long-
term bank loans only account for about 20% of total bank loans. Therefore, our
sample firms tend to rely more on short- rather than long-term bank loans. This
may reflect Chinese banks’ caution in issuing (riskier) long-term loans and/or that
Chinese PLCs rely increasingly on equity for financing long-term investments.26
Booth, Aivazian, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic (2001) also report that firms
from 10 developing countries tend to have a greater dependence on short- rather
than long-term debt.
In terms of ownership, the average shareholdings of the State and incumbent
managers are 31% and 0.07%, respectively—similar to the figures reported in
prior studies (e.g., Tian (2001)). The average log of total assets (in 10,000 RMB)
is 13.34 for our sample of firms, which is close to the average of 11.62 for all the
firms over the 1997–2003 period reported in the CSMAR database. Therefore,
our sample appears to be representative of Chinese PLCs.
The descriptive statistics also suggest that some variables (e.g., the interest
to debt ratio, SG&A expenditure, and the interest coverage ratio) have extreme
values. For example, one observation has the interest to debt ratio equal to 0.455
(i.e., the maximum value) and two observations with the interest to debt ratio
around 0.135. To avoid the undesirable influence of the extreme values, we fol-
low Pittman and Fortin (2004) and winsorize the above three variables at their
respective 99.5 percentile value in our regressions.27
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the endogenous
variables and their covariates.28 The correlation coefficients of most explanatory
variables of the insurance probit model are in the predicted directions. While
most explanatory variables of the disclosure probit model exhibit significant cor-
relations with the property insurance disclosure dummy, some of them are in a
direction contrary to what was predicted. This may signify the unique feature of
insurance disclosure. As expected, there are statistically significant correlations
between the insurance to tangible assets ratio, the debt to assets ratio and the in-
terest to debt ratio. However, a simple correlation analysis may mask the potential
two-way linkages between variables.
26However, the long-term debt ratio may not give a true picture of the level of long-term debt since
Chinese firms often use short-term debt on a rolling basis (Chen (2004), Xiao et al. (2004)).
27As reported in Section V.C, our results are qualitatively similar if we exclude rather than win-
sorize observations over the 99.5 percentile of each of the three variables. Overall, we find the extreme
values seem to have important impacts on the results of some control variables in the debt equation,
but do not affect the tenor of our major conclusions.
28The correlation coefficients between exogenous variables are not tabulated. Industry dummies
10, 14, and 19 are omitted from regression due to industry dummy 10’s high correlation with the high
property risk firms dummy and industry dummies 14 and 19’s high correlation with the high-tech
stock dummy (see the Appendix). Otherwise, correlation coefficients are moderate. We also compute
the variance inflation factor of each variable appearing in each model and they are all less than 3.
Therefore, we conclude that multicollinearity is not a severe problem (see Kennedy (1998), p. 190).
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TABLE 3
Correlation Coefficient Matrix
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation coefficients between the dependent and independent variables in the insurance
probit, disclosure probit, and the three models in the system of simultaneous equations. DEBT and COD are industry
median-adjusted debt ratio and cost of debt. In the interest of saving space, correlation coefficients between (exogenous)
independent variables are not tabulated. Industry dummies 10, 14, and 19 are omitted from regression due to industry
dummy 10’s high correlation with the high property risk firms dummy and industry dummies 14 and 19’s high correlation
with the tech stock dummy (see Appendix). Otherwise, correlation coefficients among explanatory variables are moderate.
We also compute the variance inflation factor of each variable appearing in each model and they are all less than 3. *, **,
*** are statistically significant at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels (two-tailed), respectively.
Adj.
Insurance Debt Adj.
Insurance Insurance to Tangible to Interest
Choice Disclosure Assets Assets to Debt
Dummy Dummy Ratio Ratio Ratio
Insurance to tangible assets ratio (INS) −0.09*** 0.01
Adj. debt to assets ratio (DEBT ) 0.07*** 0.03 −0.04* 0.15***
Adj. interest to debt ratio (COD) 0.05** 0.01 0.15***
Log(book value of assets) −0.61*** −0.95*** −0.16*** 0.20*** −0.10***
Capital expenditure to total assets ratio 0.08*** 0.04* −0.09*** −0.08***
Log(1 + market value of managerial shares) 0.02 0.01
Tangible assets to assets ratio 0.13*** −0.18*** 0.06** 0.09***
Fiscal subsidy to sales ratio −0.02 −0.03
State shareholding 0.02 0.02 −0.02
Quick ratio −0.12*** −0.07*** 0.09***
Secured debt to total debt ratio −0.03 0.02
Regulated utilities dummy −0.04** 0.12***
Conglomerates dummy −0.09*** 0.03 −0.06**
Eastern coast dummy 0.03
High property risk firms dummy 0.10*** 0.05**
Hi-tech stock dummy −0.02 −0.04*
Operating profit to assets −0.04*
Domestic public ownership 0.04*
Foreign ownership −0.07***
Proportion of independent directors −0.19***
Unamortized expenses to total assets ratio 0.11***
SG&A expense 0.10***
Operating profit to assets −0.30***
Firm age (years) 0.05**
Sales growth ratio −0.09***
Prime lending rate 0.02
Proportion of independent directors −0.40***
Log of board size 0.06**
Bank loans to total debt ratio 0.53***
Interest coverage ratio −0.09*** −0.10***
No. of Obs. 2,470 2,250 2,016 2,016 2,016
B. Multivariate Analysis
1. Results from the Insurance and Disclosure Probit Models
The results from the insurance and disclosure probit models are reported in
Table 4.29 Except for the industry dummies of particular interest, the results on
other industry dummies are not tabulated in order to save space. First, turning
to the results of the insurance probit model, as expected, small firms and firms
with more growth opportunities and/or more physical assets-in-place are more
likely to insure their assets. The coefficient for fiscal subsidy is negative and
significant, implying that the availability of government subsidies reduces com-
29In estimating the insurance probit model, we treat leverage and the cost of debt as being ex-
ogenous to the decision to insure. We believe this assumption should not materially bias our results
because prior studies (e.g., Ge´czy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), Graham and Rogers (2002)) argue
that it is not the yes/no decision to hedge that is important but rather it is the amount of hedging
that matters. Indeed, Ge´czy et al. (1997) find no significant impact of the yes/no decision to hedge
via derivatives on a firm’s debt capacity, whereas Graham and Rogers (2002) report a positive and
significant relation between the amount of corporate hedging (using derivatives) and debt capacity.
5/1/2008-838–JFQA #43:2 Zou and Adams Page 452
452 Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
panies’ propensity to purchase commercial insurance. Additionally, the positive
and significant coefficient for the regulated utilities dummy is consistent with the
argument of Mayers and Smith (1982) that regulated utilities are more likely to
use property insurance than less regulated firms. As expected, we find the coef-
ficient of the Eastern coast dummy is positive and significant. This suggests that
firms incorporated in China’s Eastern coast are more likely to insure their assets
than firms incorporated in inland regions.
TABLE 4
Regression Results of the Insurance Probit and the Disclosure Probit
Table 4 shows the regression results from the insurance probit and disclosure probit models. DEBT and COD are industry
median-adjusted debt ratio and cost of debt. The insurance probit model is a regression of the insurance choice dummy (1
for carrying property insurance in a given year) on a set of determinants of corporate purchase of property insurance. The
disclosure probit model is a regression of the insurance disclosure dummy (1 for disclosing property insurance spending
under the “unamortized expenses” item in the annual report) on a set of determinants of voluntary financial disclosure.
Five observations are lost due to missing values in the disclosure probit model. *, **, *** are statistically significant at
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. p-values are one-tailed if the coefficient is significant in the hypothesized
direction, and two-tailed otherwise.
Dependent Variables
Insurance Insurance
Choice Dummy Disclosure Dummy
Exp. Exp.
Variables Sign Slope p-Value Sign Slope p-Value
Constant +/− 0.0192 0.066* +/− 0.0198 0.000***
Adj. debt to assets ratio (DEBT ) + −0.0056 0.126 + −0.0068 0.950
Adj. interest to debt ratio (COD) + 0.0144 0.148
Log(book value of assets) − −0.0009 0.033** +/− −0.129 0.000***
Capital expenditure to total assets ratio + 0.0056 0.083*
Log(1 + market value of managerial shares) +/− −0.0001 0.730
Tangible assets to assets ratio + 0.0027 0.055*
Fiscal subsidy to sales ratio − −0.0013 0.073*
State shareholding +/− 0.0015 0.172
Quick ratio +/− −0.0002 0.180 + −0.0409 0.002***
Secured debt to total debt ratio + −0.0027 0.185
Regulated utilities dummy + 0.0007 0.090*
Eastern coast dummy + 0.0001 0.078*
High property risk firms dummy + 0.0002 0.383
Hi-tech stock dummy + −0.0241 0.579
Debt to assets ratio× tangible assets to assets ratio + 0.0100 0.065*
Tech stock dummy × tangible assets to assets ratio + 0.0024 0.261
Conglomerate dummies + 0.9535 0.027**
Operating profit to assets + 0.7767 0.001***
Domestic public ownership + 0.5956 0.002***
Foreign ownership + −0.6928 0.001***
Proportion of independent directors + −0.2144 0.473
Unamortized expenses to total assets ratio + 0.4001 0.001***
Year and other industry dummies +/− yes +/− yes
Pseudo-R2 82% 97%
No. of Obs. 2,470 2,250
The positive and significant coefficient estimate on the interaction between
leverage and tangible assets intensity suggests that for a given level of tangible as-
sets intensity, the propensity to purchase property insurance increases with lever-
age, or alternatively, for a given level of leverage, the propensity to purchase
property insurance increases with tangible assets intensity. Therefore, leverage
and tangible assets intensity seem to have a joint effect on the propensity to in-
sure in China. No other variables are found to have important effects on sample
firms’ incidence of insurance. It is worth noting that the coefficient of secured
debt is not significant (which may reflect the noisiness of the proxy; see footnote
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18). The pseudo-R2 of the insurance probit model is over 80% and therefore the
model has reasonably good explanatory power.
The voluntary corporate disclosure literature suggests that a firm’s finan-
cial condition, ownership structure, board composition, and industry membership
could have important impacts on the comprehensiveness of its voluntary disclo-
sures (e.g., see Wallace and Naser (1995), Chen and Jaggi (2000)). For example,
firms with a high debt ratio, a high liquidity ratio, or strong profitability are likely
to disclose more fully than other firms. This is because firms with a high debt ra-
tio may face increased demands for greater information disclosure from creditors,
while firms with a high liquidity ratio may choose to disclose more information
to outsiders in order to signal their financial strength. Managers of firms with
good financial performance may wish to provide more detailed disclosures to as-
sure investors of the prospects for future profitability and in the expectation of
improving their compensation packages. Furthermore, Chinese firms with more
public and foreign ownership and/or more independent directors are likely to dis-
close more information to reduce information asymmetry and/or lower the costs
of future equity issues. Conglomerates tend to have greater business complexity
and therefore are likely to disclose more information externally than other firms.
However, the linkage between firm size and the comprehensiveness of its disclo-
sure is less clear. For example, on the one hand, large firms may opt to disclose
less information in order to avoid increased political/regulatory scrutiny; on the
other hand, they may disclose more details because they have more stakeholders
demanding information. We also expect that firms with more unamortized ex-
penses are more likely to itemize property insurance spending and other expense
items in the annual report—a financial reporting requirement in China.
Five observations are lost due to missing values in ownership variables in the
disclosure probit model. The results from estimating our disclosure probit model
show that, as we expected, conglomerates and firms with strong profitability, more
unamortized expenses, and/or more domestic public ownership are more likely to
disclose property insurance spending in annual reports than other firms. Also,
small firms and firms with a low quick ratio and/or less foreign ownership are
more likely to disclose property insurance spending than other firms. This is
plausible because small firms tend to proportionately buy more property insurance
than their large firm counterparts (Zou et al. (2003)). Additionally, firms with a
low quick ratio may face a high cost of debt and so may have to provide lenders
with information relating to potential risks on their insured collateral. The pseudo-
R2 is over 95%, indicating a good fit for the disclosure probit model.
2. Basic Results from the System of Simultaneous Equations
Before introducing our estimation procedures, it is useful to check whether
our system of simultaneous equations is identified. Following the order condition
rule in all three equations, the number of (endogenous and exogenous) variables
missing from each equation is greater than 2 (the total number of endogenous
variables 3 minus 1) (see Kennedy (1998), p. 160). Therefore, each equation and
hence the system can be identified.
Equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
In the first stage, the endogenous variables INS, DEBT, and COD are regressed
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on all the exogenous variables in the three equations, plus the industry and year
dummies, respectively. The predicted value from each regression is then used
as the instrument for INS, DEBT, and COD, respectively. In the second stage,
equations (1), (2), and (3) are estimated using the instruments for the endoge-
nous variables and the other (exogenous) variables in the equation. We employ
the Newey-West (1987) heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC)
standard errors, as our tests indicate the existence of heteroskedasticity and auto-
correlation (Greene (2000)).
a. Main Results
Table 5, Model 1 reports the results from the second-stage three-equation
models. In equation (1), the coefficient on the predicted DEBT is negative and
statistically significant. This is consistent with the finding of Zou and Adams
(2006) that high leverage does not lead Chinese PLCs to buy more property in-
surance, but runs contrary to the evidence obtained from the U.S. (e.g., see Hoyt
and Khang (2000)). One reason may be that in China SOEs are rarely bankrupted
due to governmental concerns about maintaining public welfare and social stabil-
ity. While there are indirect costs of financial distress, such costs seem not to be
high enough to motivate the managers of firms with high leverage to increase their
property insurance coverage. Consistent with our expectations, the coefficient on
the predicted COD is positive and statistically significant, implying that a high
cost of debt may motivate Chinese managers to increase their levels of property
insurance coverage.
In equation (2), where the dependent variable is DEBT, the coefficient on
the predicted INS is positive and highly significant. This suggests that property
insurance coverage can help facilitate borrowing and thereby expand the insuring
firm’s debt capacity (since the credit risk facing the lender is reduced by property
insurance coverage). To our knowledge, this is the first evidence in the literature
showing that property insurance helps expand corporate debt capacity. On av-
erage, a one basis point increase in property insurance spending (relative to the
book value of tangible assets) tends to increase the (industry median-adjusted)
debt to assets ratio by 0.2%. Also as expected, the coefficient on the predicted
COD is negative and statistically significant. Therefore, firms with high interest
costs tend to use less debt.
Turning to the results of equation (3), which uses COD as the dependent
variable, the coefficient on the predicted INS is, as predicted, negative and sta-
tistically significant at the 0.10 level (one-tailed). Therefore, property insurance
appears to help lower the cost of debt. On average, a one basis point increase in
property insurance spending (relative to the book value of tangible assets) tends
to lower the (industry median-adjusted) interest to debt ratio by about one basis
point.30 To assess the magnitude of the associated economic benefits, we consider
a firm with average asset size and capital structure, where a one basis point de-
crease in the interest rate translates into an annual interest saving of about RMB
30The result, however, should be treated with caution as the empirical relation between the extent
of property insurance and the cost of debt may not be strictly linear. For example, property insurance
coverage may be capped at the market value or actual cash cost of the assets insured. Likewise, a
firm may not be able to lower its cost proportionately, given that lenders are looking for a minimum
required rate of return on loan business.
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0.056 million.31 To our knowledge, this is the first direct evidence on the role
of property insurance in lowering corporate borrowing costs. The coefficient on
predicted DEBT is not significant in the cost of debt equation.
b. Results on the Interaction Terms
In Model 1 of Table 5, we find that leverage is negatively correlated with
the amount of property insurance and the hi-tech stock dummy has no effect on
the amount of property insurance. As discussed previously, the relation between
these two variables and the purchase of property insurance may be conditioned
on the amount of tangible assets. Model 2 tests this possibility by including
leverage × tangible assets intensity and hi-tech stock dummy × tangible assets
intensity. After controlling for the interaction terms, leverage remains negatively
correlated with the amount of property insurance and the hi-tech stock dummy
remains statistically insignificant. The coefficient for leverage × tangible assets
intensity is, as predicted by H1b, positive and statistically significant. This sug-
gests that for a given level of tangible assets intensity, the purchase of property
insurance increases with leverage, or alternatively, for a given level of leverage,
the purchase of property insurance increases with tangible assets intensity. There-
fore, leverage and tangible assets intensity seem to have a joint effect on the pur-
chase of property insurance in China. Albeit with a positive sign, the coefficient
for hi-tech stock dummy× tangible assets intensity is not statistically significant.
Our other results are qualitatively similar to those of Model 1.
c. Results on Control Variables
Our following discussion is based on the results from Model 2 of Table 5.
Consistent with the extant literature (e.g., Mayers and Smith (1990), Zou et al.
(2003), and Zou and Adams (2006)), small companies are found to insure rel-
atively more of their tangible assets than large companies. Also, as expected,
firms with more government fiscal subsidies tend to buy less property insurance,
thereby supporting the predicted negative relation between fiscal subsidies and the
use of commercial insurance. However, at variance with what we hypothesized,
but consistent with the findings of Zou and Adams (2006), we find that Chinese
firms with a higher proportion of tangible assets tend to buy less property insur-
ance than firms with lower tangible assets intensity. It is possible that firms with
more tangible assets-in-place can effectively diversify the risk of their collateral
being impaired by unanticipated future loss events by offering lenders other tan-
gible assets as surety for loans granted. Therefore, firms with a higher proportion
of tangible assets may have less need for property.
The negative coefficient on the quick ratio runs contrary to the financial con-
straints argument, but could reflect that firms with a low quick ratio may face a
high cost of debt and need to provide insured collateral to be able to borrow. Al-
ternatively, firms with a low quick ratio are more risky and need to use insurance
on tangible assets as a contingent financing mechanism. As expected, compa-
31The average log asset value (size) for our sample firms reporting property insurance spending is
11.71; this translates into a total book worth of RMB 1,217.8 million. Applying the sample’s average
debt ratio of 46.2%, a typical sample firm on average has RMB 562.6 million of total debt. A one basis
point decrease in interest rate from increasing insurance by one basis point of the amount of tangible
assets means that roughly RMB 0.056 million of annual interest can be saved.
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nies prone to accidental property damage (e.g., oil and gas companies) tend to
purchase more property insurance than other firms, but the hi-tech stock dummy
does not appear to affect the purchase of property insurance. Additionally, as in
Graham and Rogers (2002), we do not find firms with more capital expenditure
tend to engage in more risk management (via purchasing property insurance)—a
feature that could reflect cash flow shortages in such firms. It is also plausible that
new tangible assets could help diversify the risk of collateral damage and thereby
lower the need for property insurance.
It is worth noting that the coefficient on State shareholding is positive and
significant. Therefore, firms with a higher level of State ownership appear to in-
sure more than firms with a low level of State shareholdings. This finding provides
some support for the political incentive hypothesis. We find no other variables
having significant coefficients in the regression.32
On the other determinants of the debt to assets ratio, while neither the static
trade-off model nor the POH is fully supported by our results, the trade-off model
appears to gain more relevance. Specifically, consistent with the static trade-off
model, large firms and firms with more tangible assets, less non-debt tax shields,
and/or less growth opportunities tend to use more debt than other firms. In con-
trast, the negative and significant coefficient on the ratio of operating profit to total
assets conforms to the prediction of the POH. These findings also are consistent
with the evidence from several prior studies (e.g., Chen (2004), Zou and Xiao
(2006)) on the determinants of capital structure of listed companies in China.
The negative and significant coefficient of the interest coverage ratio in equa-
tion (2) may imply that firms with adequate interest coverage could be profitable
and more likely to secure financing via retained profit rather than borrowing. In-
deed, we find firms with strong profitability tend to have low leverage. Alterna-
tively, profitable firms are able to issue shares to raise capital under the Chinese
equity issuance controls that impose minimum profitability requirements. Fur-
thermore, the coefficient of State ownership is negative and significant, indicating
that firms with a high level of State ownership tend to have lower leverage. This
finding is consistent with the argument that firms with a high level of State own-
ership tend to have better access to stock market finance.
The results on the other determinants of the interest to debt ratio are gener-
ally consistent with our theoretical predictions. Specifically, large firms and firms
with high sales growth rates, and/or an adequate interest coverage ratio tend to
enjoy lower rates of interest. Firms with large boards are found to have a higher
borrowing cost, which may be explained by Yermack’s (1996) view that large
boards reduce firms’ financial performance and thereby increase borrowing costs.
Anderson et al. (2004) rely on the assumption that a large board is more effective
than a small board in improving the quality of financial statements and thereby
helps lower the cost of debt. However, in China, a large corporate board (which is
32The result on managerial ownership is different from Zou and Adams (2006) (using a sample
of 235 Chinese firms for the period 1997 through 1999) in that they report a positive and significant
coefficient. In addition to the cross-sectional/time-series differences between their study and ours,
one possible reason might be that in 2001 the CSRC abolished the practice of offering new shares to
company managers at the time of an IPO. As a result, managers often have to buy company shares (if
they wish) from the secondary market at a much higher price than the IPO price. This may weaken
the effect of managerial shareholdings on the property insurance decision.
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often dominated by executive directors and/or representatives of large sharehold-
ers) may not lead to stronger independence and greater strategic and operational
effectiveness. Finally, Chinese firms’ borrowing costs are found to increase with
the proportion of debt from bank loans. This suggests that in China bank loans
are more expensive to use than other forms of debt, which may operate in a more
competitive environment.
C. Robustness Checks
In this section, we conduct several robustness checks to examine the sensi-
tivity of our results. Importantly, our major results survive these further tests.
1. Effect of the Asian Financial Crisis
The Asian financial crisis occurred in 1997 and so it is interesting to see
whether our major results are confounded by this crisis. We run a model using a
sample without the 169 observations from 1997. Our major results reported under
Model 3 in Table 5 are qualitatively similar despite changes in the coefficients of
some control variables (e.g., the quick ratio in equation (1) and State ownership
in equation (3)). As another check, we define a year-break dummy variable that
takes 1 for years 1997 through 2000 and 0 for years 2001 through 2003. We then
include this dummy and its interactions with each of the predicted values of our
three endogenous variables (derived from the first-stage OLS regressions) in the
second-stage regressions. We reestimate Model 2 of Table 5 and in unreported
results,33 the year-break dummy and the interactions with the three endogenous
variables are not statistically significant and our major findings remain unchanged.
Therefore, there is no evidence that our major results are confounded by the Asian
financial crisis.
2. Average Regression
As our sample is a pooled time-series and cross-sectional dataset, we also
conduct regressions using data averaged over the sample period. However, one
caveat in using average data is that it may cause a loss of some useful information.
The results reported in Model 4 of Table 5 show that our major results on the
leverage-insurance relation and the cost of debt-insurance relation still hold. One
difference is that the estimate of the coefficient of INS is now negative and highly
significant in the cost of debt model (i.e., equation (3)), while it is only marginally
significant in the pooled analysis.
3. Additional Control Variable
We include the natural logarithm of the number of employees as a further
control variable in the insurance model (i.e., equation (1)). This is because in
China the issue of employment and job protection may prompt politically con-
nected company managers to purchase property insurance. As many Chinese
firms did not disclose such data item in 1997 and 1998, the sample size is signifi-
cantly reduced. However, such a reduced sample serves as another opportunity to
33Unreported results are available from the authors.
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examine the tenor of our major findings. In unreported results from the insurance
probit model, the coefficient on the employee variable is positive and significant
(p-value= 0.06, one-tailed). The results from the simultaneous equation analysis
are reported under Model 5 of Table 5. The coefficient estimate of the employee
variable in the insurance equation is positive and significant. These results support
the view that in China, employment and job protection may be a factor affecting
the corporate purchase of property insurance. However, our major findings on the
three endogenous variables are unaffected.
Our sample comprises firms listed only in domestic stock exchanges and
firms whose shares are traded in both domestic and overseas exchanges (e.g.,
Hong Kong). The latter firms have better access to equity financing and are sub-
ject to a higher standard of monitoring and more stringent mandatory disclosure
rules that may help to increase their debt capacity. We include in the debt equation
a dummy variable DUALLIST taking 1 for overseas listing status and rerun Mod-
els 1–5 of Table 5. In unreported results, the estimated coefficient of DUALLIST
ranges from 0.126 to 0.142 and is consistently significant at the 0.01 level (two-
tailed). This result supports the view that, other things being equal, firms listed
in more established overseas stock exchanges tend to have a greater debt capacity
(on average about 13% higher) than firms that are only listed in domestic stock
exchanges. However, there is little change in the results for the other variables.
4. Other Tests
As a further check, we estimated the system of simultaneous equations using
the three-stage least squares (3SLS) regression. The 3SLS regression estimation
is a “full information” method that utilizes all the zero restrictions in the sys-
tem instead of estimating the structural parameters of each equation separately.
However, Newey-West heteroskedastic and autocorrelation consistent standard
errors are not available for the 3SLS estimation; in contrast, the 2SLS estima-
tor is shown to be quite robust to heteroskedasticity and specification errors (see
Kennedy (1998), p. 165). As such, we place more weights on the 2SLS results.
In unreported results, in addition to the previous findings that a high cost of debt
leads to more insurance purchases and insurance purchases help expand debt ca-
pacity and reduce the cost of debt, we also find the coefficient of leverage is pos-
itive and significant in the insurance model, but the coefficient of the interaction
term between leverage and tangible assets ratio is unexpectedly negative and sig-
nificant. We place less weight on the latter findings due to the econometric issues
with 3SLS.
Finally, we excluded observations with values over the 99.5 percentile of the
cost of debt, interest coverage ratio, or SG&A expense rather than winsorize the
observations. We repeated the analysis of Models 1–5 and our major findings are
not changed by this treatment.
In Models 1–5, the coefficients for the inverse Mills ratios are generally in-
significant in the insurance model, while the coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio
from the insurance probit model is positive and significant in some of the lever-
age models. This suggests that the unobserved factors that may prompt firms to
insure their assets tend to be positively correlated with leverage. In contrast, the
coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio from the insurance probit model is generally
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negative and significant in the cost of debt model, implying that the unobserved
factors that prompt firms to insure their assets tend to be negatively correlated
with the cost of debt. We also find the coefficient of the inverse Mills ratio from
the insurance disclosure probit model is generally positive and significant in the
cost of debt model. Therefore, the unobserved factors that induce firms to disclose
their property insurance in annual reports tend to be positively correlated with the
cost of debt.
VI. Conclusion
This study extends the corporate risk management literature in two key re-
gards. First, we test whether corporate risk management expands debt capacity
within the context of property insurance. Second, we focus more broadly on the
linkage between commonly used property insurance and the overall cost of bor-
rowing.
Our results suggest that in China, a high cost of debt appears to induce the
corporate use of property insurance, but high leverage alone does not lead to the
purchase of property insurance. The latter finding might reflect the unique in-
stitutional setting of China—for example, the cost of financial distress might be
lower than in the West. We observe that leverage and tangible assets intensity
seem to exert a positive joint effect on the corporate purchase of property insur-
ance. On the effect of insurance, we find evidence supporting the contention that
property insurance helps expand insuring firms’ debt capacity and helps lower
their borrowing costs. However, the limited evidence on the cost reduction effect
suggests that lowering the borrowing cost is likely to be a concern secondary to
facilitating corporate borrowings and thereby expanding debt capacity in corpo-
rate property insurance decisions in China. Indeed, buying insurance can still be
optimal even when the savings in the cost of debt do not exceed the insurance
premium given many other benefits of insurance (e.g., expanded debt capacity,
reduced bankruptcy risk, and financial distress costs).
Finally, our evidence on the role of property insurance in expanding debt
capacity complements Graham and Rogers’ (2002) study on financial derivatives
hedging in the U.S. corporate sector. The evidence that property insurance helps
lower the cost of debt extends the results of prior studies (i.e., Cole and Officer
(1981), Kidwell et al. (1987)) on the interest cost advantages of purchasing fi-
nancial guarantee insurance. Therefore, taken together, debt capacity, the cost of
debt, and corporate property insurance appear to be simultaneously related. We
believe that future studies should use datasets from developed economies to assess
the generality of our results.
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APPENDIX
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variables Definition Data Source
1. Insurance choice
dummy
1 = carrying property insurance in a
firm/year and 0 for otherwise.
Annual report search, survey and 75
non-insurance observations from Zou and
Adams (2006)
2. Log(book value of
assets)
Natural logarithm of book values of total
assets (in 10,000 RMB).
CSMAR database
3. Debt to assets ratio Total liabilities÷ total assets. CSMAR database
4. Interest to debt ratio (Interest charges in the profit and loss
account + interest capitalized in the current
year in balance sheet)÷ total liabilities.
Interest data are from WIND system or
collected from annual reports
5. Tangible assets to
assets ratio
(Fixed assets + inventory)÷ total assets. CSMAR database
6. Capital expenditure to
total assets ratio
Annual expenditure in acquiring new fixed
assets and intangible assets÷ total assets.
CSMAR database
7. Log(1 + market value
of managerial shares)
Natural logarithm of (1 + total number of
managerial shareholdings× monthly
average A-share price in the year
concerned) (market value is in RMB).
Shareholdings data are collected from
annual reports; monthly share price data are
from DataStream database
8. Fiscal subsidy to sales
ratio
Total annual subsidies received from the
government÷ total sales income.
CSMAR database
9. Proportion of State
shareholdings
Total number of State-held shares÷ total
shares outstanding.
CSMAR database
10. Quick ratio (Current assets− inventory)÷ current
liabilities.
CSMAR database
11. Secured debt to total
debt ratio
Total amount of secured bank loans and
other debt ÷ total liabilities.
Secured debt is hand-collected from annual
reports
12. Insurance disclosure
dummy
1 = a firm/year disclosed property insurance
spending in the annual report.
Search of annual reports
13. Operating profit to
assets ratio
Operating profit÷ the prior year-end total
assets.
CSMAR database
14. Domestic public
ownership
(Number of tradable A-shares÷ total shares
outstanding.)
CSMAR database
15. Foreign ownership (Number of foreign-founder shares +
number of domestically traded B-shares +
number of overseas traded H-shares)÷
total shares outstanding.
CSMAR database
16. Proportion of
independent directors
Number of independent directors÷ board
size.
CSMAR database
17. Unamortized expenses
to total assets ratio
Amount of unamortized expenses÷ total
assets.
CSMAR database
18. Insurance-to-tangible
assets ratio
Property insurance spending÷ the prior
year-end value of fixed assets and inventory.
Insurance data are collected from annual
reports
19. SG&A expense Sales expenses, general and administrative
expenses (including depreciation but
excluding interest)÷ sales income.
CSMAR database
20. Firm age (years) Number of years since incorporation. CSMAR database
21. Sales growth ratio Current sales income÷ last year’s sales
income.
CSMAR database
22. Prime lending rate The 1–3 year interest rate of bank loans set
by the People’s Bank of China (PBOC).
from the PBOC’s official website
23. Log of board size Natural log of total number of board directors CSMAR database
24. Bank loans to total
debt ratio
(Short-term bank borrowing + long-term
bank borrowing)÷ total liabilities.
CSMAR database
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX (continued)
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variables Definition Data Source
25. Interest coverage ratio Earnings before interest, tax, and
extraordinary items÷ (interest charges in
the profit and loss account + interest
capitalized in the current year in the balance
sheet).
Earnings are from CSMAR database; interest
data are from WIND system or collected
from annual reports
26. Industry dummy 1
(regulated utilities)
For regulated electric, gas, and sanitary
service firms.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = D0
27. Industry dummy 2
(high property risk
firms dummy)
For firms manufacturing chemicals, plastics
and rubber, oil and gas exploration &
refining, coal mining or metallurgical
engineering firms.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = B0; C4; C6
28. Industry dummy 3
(high-tech stock
dummy)
For Internet stock, firms manufacturing
computer software and hardware,
communications equipment,
pharmaceuticals and bio-tech firms.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C8; G8; L1
29. Industry dummy 4 For firms engaging in agriculture, forestry, or
fishing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = A0
30. Industry dummy 5 For firms engaging in metal mining, coal
mining, or oil & gas extraction.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = B0
31. Industry dummy 6 For firms engaging in foodstuff or beverage
production.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C0
32. Industry dummy 7 For firms engaging in textile products or
apparel manufacturing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C1
33. Industry dummy 8 For firms engaging in furniture and fixture
manufacturing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C2
34. Industry dummy 9 For firms engaging in paper and allied
products manufacturing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C3
35. Industry dummy 10 For firms engaging in petroleum refining,
chemicals, rubbers or plastics production.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C4
36. Industry dummy 11 For firms engaging in electronic equipment
and components (except computer).
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C5
37. Industry dummy 12 For firms in primary metal industry. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C6
38. Industry dummy 13 For firms engaging in industrial machinery or
transportation equipment manufacturing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C7
39. Industry dummy 14 For pharmaceutical or bio-tech firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C8
40. Industry dummy 15 For miscellaneous manufacturing industry. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = C9
41. Industry dummy 16 For construction firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = E0
42. Industry dummy 17 For transportation firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = F0
43. Industry dummy 18 For warehousing firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = F2
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX (continued)
Variable Definitions and Data Sources
Variables Definition Data Source
44. Industry dummy 19 For firms engaging in communication
equipment or computer manufacturing.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = G8
45. Industry dummy 20 For wholesale trading firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = H0
46. Industry dummy 21 For retail trading firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = H1
47. Industry dummy 22 For real estate firms and property
developers.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = J0
48. Industry dummy 23 For firms engaging in hotel and lodging
business.
The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = K3
49. Industry dummy 24 For software and Internet firms. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = L1
50. Industry dummy 25
(conglomerates)
For conglomerates. The 2001 CSRC Industry Classification-B
code = M
51. Eastern coast dummy 1 for firms from China’s Eastern coast and 0
for firms incorporated in inland areas.
CSMAR database
All variables are measured over the period 1997 through 2003. Industry dummies 10, 14, and 19 are omitted from
regression due to industry dummy 10’s high correlation with the high property risk firms dummy and industry dummies 14
and 19’s high correlation with the high-tech stock dummy.
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